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Belle Terre v. Boraas
O N APRIL 1, 1974, THE SUPREME COURT announced its opinion inthe first zoning case of constitutional dimensions that the Court
had decided in the last forty-six years.' In sustaining the ordinance
of the Village of Belle Terre, with its restrictive definition of "family,"
the Court reaffirmed its respect for the lines drawn by legislatures
in the area of zoning and equal protection.2 The Belle Terre decision
reaffirmed the validity of one municipality's mechanism for preserv-
ing the style of life of its inhabitants, free from exposure to one
element of the counterculture, the voluntary cooperative association
of unrelated persons: the commune. What effects the Belle Terre
case will have on similar uses of zoning ordinances to protect the
citizens of a community from persons with modes of living different
from their own, including other races, the poor, the young, the old,
the unmarried, former prison inmates, and those undergoing re-
habilitation from mental illness or addiction to alcohol or narcotics,
remains to be seen.
Summary of the Decision
The Village of Belle Terre is a community of seven hundred
persons and approximately two hundred twenty homes in Suffolk
County, New York. It is zoned exclusively for one-family dwellings3
excluding lodging, boarding, fraternity, sorority, and multiple dwell-
ing houses. A village ordinance defines "family" as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption or
marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeep-
ing unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of per-
sons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood,
adoption or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.4
On December 31, 1971, appellees Edwin and Judith Dickman
leased their house in Belle Terre to Michael Truman. Later five other
students from the nearby State University of New York at Stoney
Brook moved into the house. On July 31, 1972, the Dickmans received
an "Order to Remedy Violations" of the ordinance from the village.
1A. CASNER AND W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1207 (2d ed. 1969);
Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REv. 767, 783 (1969).
2Belle Terre v. Boraas - ------------ U.S ............ 94 S.Ct. 1536 (1974); Eudid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3 A one-family dwelling is defined as, "A detached house consisting of or intended to be
occupied as a residence by one family only .... BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF THE
VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE, ART. 1, § D-1.34a (1971).
4 BUILDING ZONE ORDINANCE OF THE VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE, Art. I, § D-1.35a (June
8, 1970).
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Appellees then brought an action under the federal Civil Rights Act
of 18715 against the mayor and trustees of the Village of Belle Terre
asking for an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and
a declaratory judgment invalidating the definition of "family" as
unconstitutional. 6
The District Court upheld the ordinance 7 but the Court of Ap-
peals reversed.8 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, 9
holding that the case dealt with economic and social legislation through
which legislatures have historically drawn lines which the Court
respects against charges of violation of the equal protection clause
if the law is "reasonable, not arbitrary"1 0 and bears "a rational re-
lationship to a (permissible) state objective."" The Court recognized
that every line which a legislature draws leaves some out who could
have been included, and that the exercise of discretion is a legislative
function, not a judicial one. Here the ordinance, which involved no
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, was a valid land-
use regulation.12
Mr. Justice Douglas, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
pointed out that the case brought to the Court a different phase of
zoning regulations from those it had previously considered. He went
on to discuss two of the Supreme Court's previous land use decisions.' 3
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company" the Court sustained a
zoning ordinance, stating: "If the validity of the legislative classifica-
tion for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control."' 5
Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that the essence of Euclid to
the Court in 1926 was the exclusion of apartments and industries
from residential sections, and in relation to this the 1926 Court
commented on the desire to keep residential areas free of
"disturbing noises"; "increased traffic"; "the hazard of mov-
542 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Appellees included three of the students who had occupied the house.
7 Boraas v. Belle Terre, 367 F.Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
8Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1973).
'Belle Terre v. Boraas, -U-S , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974).
'0 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
1 --- ---- U.S ---------- 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971).
12 Belle Terre v. Boraas -.........U S ---------- -, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1940 (1974).
13 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
14 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
11 Id. at 388.
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ing and parked automobiles"; the "depriving children of the
privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those
in more favored localities."' 6
The Court in Belle Terre v. Boraas, returned to these and similar
traditional zoning justifications when it upheld the definition of "fam-
ily" in the Belle Terre zoning ordinance. 17
The Court also relied on Berman v. Parkeri8 for its conclusion
that "A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project
addressed to family needs." 19
Berman v. Parker,20 a land-use case but not a zoning case, up-
held the validity of certain sections of the District of Columbia Re-
development Act of 1945. In respecting the constitutional attack on
the Act, the Court declined to define an outer limit of the police
power on which zoning ordinances are based.
The Court in Belle Terre used the two-level 2l approach to equal
protection and applied the minimal scrutiny test.22 The Court suc-
cinctly disposed of all of the challenges proffered by the appellees
and any thought of applying the strict scrutiny test in a few short
sentences:
It [the ordinance] is not aimed at transients. It involves
no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others
such as was presented by Griffin v. Illinois .... It involves
no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution,
such as voting,... ; the right of association .... ; the right
of access to the court, .. .; or any rights of privacy ....
(cases omitted).23
16 ....... U.S ............., 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1539 (1974), quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
'
7 Belle Terre v. Boraas ........... U.S .......... ,94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540-41 (1974). See note 24 infra.
8 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19Belle Terre v. Boraas, U.S - ,94 S.Ct. 1541 (1974).
20 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court in Berman.
21 The two levels being minimal scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The use of this two-level approach during the Warren Court has been described by one
commentator in the following way. "Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal pro-
tection, with scrutiny that was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the
deferential 'old' equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually
none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HAV. L. REV.
1,8 (1972).
2Belle Terre v. Boraas, .. U.S......94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974). The test being,
is the law reasonable, not arbitrary, and does it bear a rational relationship to a permissible
state objective.
23 Id.
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The ordinance was found to be valid using the traditional justi-
fications for zoning.24
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented and would have vacated the
judgment and remanded to the District Court for further proceed-
ings, feeling that no case or controversy existed.
Mr. Justice Marshall also dissented and would have held the
ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of the tenants' fundamental
rights of association and privacy, guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments. Because of the involvement of these "funda-
mental" rights, he applied the strict scrutiny test and found that the
Village of Belle Terre failed to show a compelling governmental in-
terest 25 and also failed to show that if there was a compelling gov-
ernmental interest that no less intrusive means could protect that
interest.
Mr. Justice Marshall, throughout his opinion, expressed a basic
agreement with the statements of majority in the Court's opinion.2 6
His dissent stems from his belief that while zoning officials may
concern themselves with the use of the land, it is not their proper
concern who the people are who are using it, or what their beliefs
are, or how they choose to live.27 This "social preference" zoning28
formed the basis of the decision of the District Court in this case..29
The District Court had refused to uphold the ordinance on tra-
ditional zoning grounds, 30 but did uphold it as a "lawful exercise of
a 'legally protectable affirmative interest'" in traditional families.31
The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the ordinance could
not be sustained on such "social preferences"32 that had no relevance
2A Id. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-32, Purposes of zoning; essential considerations:
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
designed for one or more of the following purposes: to lessen congestion in the
streets; secure safety from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; promote health,
morals or the general welfare; provide adequate light and air; prevent the
overcrowding of land or buildings; avoid undue concentration of population ....
(West 1967).
2s Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
2Belle Terre v. Boraas, U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1542 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). At one point he states that he sees nothing unconstitutional with a town
limiting the density of residential areas as long as they do not use suspect criteria to
do the limiting. Id. at 1545.
DId. at 1544.
2 Note, Excluding the Commaune from Suburbia: The Use of Zoning for Social Control, 23
HASTINGS L. J. 1459 (1972).
29Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1973).
30Id.
31 Id.
32 1d. at 813, 814
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to the public health, safety, and welfare.33 It also agreed with the
District Court that traditional zoning justifications could not sup-
port the ordinance, but instead of applying the minimal scrutiny
test, (or for that matter the strict scrutiny test), it applied an
"intermediate scrutiny" equal protection test.3'
While there is certainly confusion as to what the test consists
of, 35 and what to call it,36 there is general agreement that it exists.37
But Judge Timbers in his dissent in the Court of Appeals best
measured the pulse of the Supreme Court when he expressed doubt
that the Supreme Court would invoke the newer equal protection test
in "traditional 'hands-off' areas of legislative activity. '38
Village of Belle Terre and Exclusionary Zoning
With the Court's failure to find any fundamental right in-
volved39 and its use of the minimal scrutiny test 40 the question must
33 Id.
3I d. at 819 (dissenting opinion); see Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword,
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
3s For example in the Court of Appeals case, Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), one can choose from the enunciation of the majority, at 815, or the interpretation
of that enunciation by the dissenting judge, at 819-22, or the majority's own interpreta-
tion of its enunciation, at 815 n. 8. The test applied appears to be whether the legisla-
tive classification in fact, rather than hypothetically, has a substantial relationship to a
lawful objective. For thoughts by other courts on this "newer equal protection test" see
note 37 infra.
a While the majority of the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, has apparently attempted to
avoid calling it anything, Judge Timbers in his dissent accepted the challenge and referred
to it at various places as the "intermediate scrutiny" test, the "new means scrutiny equal
protection standard", and the "new rationality test". Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806,
819-24 (2d Cit. 1973).
Gunther, supra note 34, refers to it as an "invigorated old equal protection scrutiny"
and a "means-oriented scrutiny" test.
Elsewhere it has been identified as a "means-evaluation" or "sliding scale" test. Note,
Up the Down-Sliding Scale: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre and Equal Protection Assault
on Restrictive Definitions of "Family" in Zoning Ordinances, 49 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
428 (1973).
37 Since the Supreme Court has never articulated the new test, just how viable it is at any point
in time is questionable. Arguments that there is a new test claim to find support in such
cases as James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Yet in even more cases the Court has continued to apply the traditional two-level ap-
proach to equal protection. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 435 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
One district court classified the new test as just a stricter version of the "minimal
scrutiny" test. Spatt v. New York, 361 F.Supp. 1048 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). A second
district court thought that the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, supra, would 'preempt
the Boraas formulation" of the Second Circuit. Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F.Supp. 432,
440 (D. Vt. 1973).
3Boraas v. Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 822 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
39 Belle Terre v. Boraas -...........U.S ---..------- 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974)-
40 Id.; see note 22 supra.
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be asked whether this decision represents a green light to exclusion-
ary zoning.41
It first must be pointed out that the definition of "family" in
and of itself is not an exclusionary device, using the commonly ac-
cepted definitions of "exclusionary zoning." 42 If it were to be estab-
lished that more minorities or poor people form voluntary families
than other segments of the population, then the definition of "family"
could be considered an exclusionary device, even if not the most
useful one.
Rather than as an exclusionary device the Court viewed the or-
dinance as promoting family values and protecting the environment
so that the zone could be a "sanctuary for people." The courts and
legislatures have long recognized the special significance of the family
in American life.4 While there is certainly evidence that this signifi-
cance is extending beyond the traditional "blood, marriage, adoption"
family, it has not gone so far as to include communes or other large
voluntary families.45 But wherever the community can validly zone
single-family it can, according to this decision, exclude voluntary
families of more than two. 6 The use of arguments for preservation
41 Davidoff and Davidoff define exclusionary zoning as:
* . . the complex of zoning practices which results in dosing suburban housing
and land markets to low-and moderate-income families. Davidoff and Davidoff,
Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYR. L. REv.
509, 519 (1971).
421d. See generally Note, Excluding the Commune from Suburia: The Use of Zoning for
Social Control, 23 HAST. L. J. 1459 (1972); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Note,
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - Zoning, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home
be a Castle? 69 MICH L. REV. 339 (1970).
4
3Belle Terre v. Boraas, -. U.S. ___ 94 S.Ct. 1536 ,1540 (1974).
" See, Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV.
226 (1973); Comments, All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 393 (1972).
4See Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 366 F.Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Hurley v. Van Late,
365 F.Supp. 186 (S.D. N.Y. 1973). Cf. Moreno v. Department of Agriculture, 413 U.S.
528 (1973). But cf. Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973).
46 The extent of the limitation is not as dear as it seems. For example is a household con-
sisting of a mother, her child, and an unrelated man a household of "persons . . . not
exceeding two . .. not related by blood adoption or marriage . . ."? Would two unrelated
adults who are caring for a legally assigned foster child qualify? Or one adult with two
foster children?
A statute like N.J. STAT. ANN. 10: 5-12(h) (1) (1970) that prohibits refusing
rental to someone or some group because of "marital status or sex" would solve some of
the problems. See Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d
754 (1973). The proposed equal rights amendment might eliminate some of the problems,
and prevent an even narrower definition of "family". Cf. The Legality of Homosexual
Marriage, 82 YALE L. J. 573, 583-588 (1973).
In United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) the Court
found a regulation that prevented even two unrelated people living together from
receiving food stamps to be unconstitutional. The Court found the classification "not
only 'imprecise', [but also) . . .wholly without any rational basis." That presumably would
be the fate of any zoning ordinance that tried to limit the number of unrelated persons
in its definition of "family" to less than two.
1974)
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of the environment to support density and housing type restrictions
is a legitimate argument if it is remembered that it is only one part
of the environment that is being protected, not the environment
itself.47
If the definition of "family" is not an exclusionary device, the
use of single-family zoning may be.'8 Everything else being equal it
is just more expensive to build a single-family home than a multiple
dwelling unit, on a per family basis.49 And even though the entire
Village of Belle Terre 0 was zoned for single-family dwellings, the
Court's decision should not be interpreted as approving such zoning
for all communities. The issue of zoning an entire community single-
family was apparently not raised by the appellees. In any case, while
the justifications for the definition of "family" and the use of single-
family zoning are similar, Mr. Justice Douglas was careful to speak
of "zones" and 'a land use project" and not of cities, villages, and
other political subdivisions.51 There is nothing in the Court's decision
that should even give it pause if it were to decide that a political
subdivision could not zone completely single-family. 52
While it cannot be doubted that the Belle Terre53 is a strong re-
affirmation of the doctrine of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,m it does not
follow that this is the death knell to challenges to exclusionary zon-
ing. Those challenges that succeeded, succeeded despite Euclid, and
would probably succeed despite Belle Terre. What this decision does
do is offer little, if any, hope to those many challenges that have
failed. 55 The Court had the opportunity to give the courts a more
active role in the scrutiny of zoning ordinances and declined to take it.
The key, as in most equal protection challenges, is the selection
of the test to be applied.5 6 Here the Court failed to find the involve-
4 7 R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 122 (1973).
48 Id. at 17. Davidoff and Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use
Controls, 22 SYR. L. REV. 509, 520-522 (1971).
49 R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 8 (1973).
50 A land area of less than one square mile.
51 Belle Terre v. Boraas, --------- U.S .- , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974).
52 For example, single use zoning is not invalid per se in Missouri. United States v. Black
Jack, No. 71 C 372 (1) (E.D. Mo. March 20, 1974); Bosch v. Uplands Park, 494
S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1973); McDermott v. Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. en banc
1970).
Some other states have "fair share" policies that force each city or town to accept
its "fair share" of unpopular types of housing. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970); see R. BABCOCK and F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 102-104
(1973).
53.. .. .S. .... 94 S.Ct. 1536 (1974).
s-272 U.S. 365 (1926).
.s
5 See e.g.. United States v. Black Jack, No. 71 C 372 (1) (E.D. Mo. March 20, 1974);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974).
56 See note 21 supra.
[Vol. 23:354
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ment of any fundamental right57 and essentially disposed of all the
challenges to the ordinance in one sentence: "We find none of these
reasons in the record before us." 58 Along with this it completely
ignored the equal protection test used by the Court of Appeals. 59 While
it may have been a great disappointment to the advocates of opening
up the suburbs, the decision is nothing more than maintenance of the
status quo. That is, unless discrimination on the basis of race,60 or
possibly wealth,6 1 can be demonstrated, a challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance on constitutional grounds will probably fail.
Some observers may view Belle Terre62 as signaling the end of
the "effect" doctrine6 but this is surely a pessimistic view since
race was not an issue here. Perhaps a more important concept to be
concerned with is the right to travel. The right to travel has been
advocated as a "fundamental" right ever since Shapiro v. Thomp-
son,64 but was conspicuously absent from the Belle Terre Court's list
of those fundamental rights found not to be involved.65 Instead, Mr.
57 Belle Terre v. Boraas, U.S..., 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974).
5 Id.
9 See notes 34-37 supra.
60 But discrimination on the basis of race, even with the "effect" doctrine, is difficult to
prove. In United States v. Black Jack, No. 71 C 372(1) (E.D. Mo. March 20, 1974), the
unincorporated area of Black Jack, Missouri, faced with a proposed low and moderate
income multi-unit development, incorporated and passed a zoning ordinance which
excluded all new multiple-family dwellings. While one of the reasons put forward for
incorporation was unhappiness over the proposed development, traditional zoning ob-
jectives were given as the reason for the unhappiness and were used to support the zoning
ordinance. Allegations of racial "intent", motivation, and purpose were made but were not
proven since it is seldom that authorities nowadays will express a racial intent.
Much statistical evidence was then used to try to prove a racially discriminatory
effect of the zoning ordinance in that more blacks than whites would be served by the
development and that the development would contain a greater percentage of blacks to
whites than Black Jack previously had.
The court found only one statistic relevant to the first argument, and that was that
the development was designed for the income range that contained 32% of the blacks and
29% of the whites in the SMSA. The effect of excluding this class was not found to be
racially discriminatory. As to the second argument, the court accepted the government's
statistic that the development would contain a higher percentage of blacks than previously
existed in Black Jack. Along with that they used the statistic that a higher percentage of
blacks of all incomes rent. The conclusion that the court came to was that if they accepted
the government's argument, then the zoning ordinance would be invalid against all
multiple-dwelling developments until a proper "racial mix" was achieved since they all
would result in greater integration. The court pointed out that Congress refused to
remove federally-subsidized housing from local zoning control, and that this court would
not take the step to remove all multi-family dwellings from local control in "dispropor-
tionate" cities.
61 Particularly since San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
it is questionable whether wealth might be a suspect class but in many areas it would
seem to be difficult to discriminate against the poor without discriminating against blacks
as well.
62 Belle Terre v. Boraas, U.S. ,94 S.Ct. 1536 (1974).
63 See note 61 supra.
"394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65 Belle Terre v. Boraas ,... ----- U.S -------- , 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1540 (1974). But c.f., Construc-
tion Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. Petaluma -..........- F.Supp ............ (N.D. Cal.
1974).
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Justice Douglas addressed himself to the right to travel challenge
with the simple statement that "It [the ordinance] is not aimed at
transients. ' 66 If the fundamental right to travel can be circumscribed
by not aiming an ordinance at transients, then it is not a very useful
right in zoning challenges.
With approximately one out of every eight American families
unable to afford standard housing6 7 any issue that affects the quan-
tity or quality of housing is of great concern. And land-use controls,
such as a restrictive definition of "family," single-family zoning,
large lot zoning, and minimum house sizes, certainly affect both the
cost of housing and the supply and demand of housing.68 If these
devices are having a serious effect on these house-poor families
69
why did the Court pass up its chance in Belle Terre to reverse the
presumption of constitutionality0 that exists with zoning ordinances?
The answer can only be that the Court recognized the vital importance
of local zoning. Even Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent did so when
he said:
It may indeed be the most essential function performed
by local government, for it is one of the primary means by
which we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept
of quality of life.71
With the Belle Terre decision it is apparent that the Court is
satisfied with the present state of zoning law with its local control and
its presumption of constitutionality. If this is any indication, and it
seems to be one, it will be a few more years before the Supreme Court
decides another zoning case.
Stewart Goldsteint
66 1d.
67REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME
7 (1968).
6R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 17 (1973).
69 It is not universally accepted that exclusionary zoning devices hurt the low income urban
residents. In fact it has been asserted that they are more beneficial than harmful in that they
actually keep the moderate income blacks and whites in the urban area and not the poor,
who could not afford suburbia even if there was no zoning at all. If the moderate income
residents fled the city, municipal services would decline (with the decline in city tax in-
come) to such an extent that it would more than offset any temporary gain through the
"filtering-down" of middle income housing. This would cause a further decline in property
values and thus property tax income. Bergin, Price-Exclusionary Zoning: A Social Analysis,
47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1972).
Clearly a great majority of law review articles at least find that exclusionary zoning
hurts the low-income urban resident. See note 42 supra. But other factors, not closely re-
lated to zoning, have just as great an effect on housing in America. Factors such as the cost
of money, inflation, the changing locations of employment, the availability of federal funds
to developers, building codes, and the difficulty in building successful low income housing
in sufficient quantity will all remain even if all exclusionary zoning devices are eliminated.
70 1 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.14 (1968).
71 Belle Terre v. Boraas ....... U.S -.....94 S. Ct. 1536, 1543 (1974).
t Law Review Candidate; second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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